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APPLICATION OF THE TEACHER EXCEPTION
DOCTRINE TO ON-LINE COURSES
Laura Leslie*
I. INTRODUCTION
The issues surrounding copyright law continually change with ad-
vances in technology. Today, many universities are exploring the use of
computers to offer on-line courses. With the increasing popularity of dis-
tance education, issues surrounding copyright ownership are on the rise.
Historically, there has been a custom of faculty ownership to works created
by professors while employed at universities.' Some argue that universities
have allowed professors to retain ownership because of the lack of profit
associated with many academic publications.2 While it is true that not all
academic works produce substantial profits, it is also true that universities
have other interests aside from profit in allowing faculty to retain copyright
ownership. However, on-line courses do present unique problems.
Universities can offer the same on-line course semester after semester
without continually paying the professor who originally created the course
This does present universities with a huge profit incentive. Consequently,
many universities have begun to review their position on copyright
ownership relating to faculty works.
Because the use of on-line courses is relatively new, these problems
have not yet been litigated in the courts. Agreements between faculty and
administration currently vary across universities. Most universities treat the
faculty as the original owner, but require an assignment of rights.4 The
American Association of University Professors takes the position that the
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2003; Bachelor of Arts, University of California,
Berkeley, 1999. This Note is dedicated to my Mom and Dad and to my grandparents James and Dorothy
Heron for their continued encouragement, love, and support.
1. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright Issues In Online Courses Ownership, Authorship And Conflict, 18
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH, L.J. 1 (2001).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id. at 4.
Journal of Legislation
faculty members should own the "courseware" they create.5 This seems to
me to be both the better and more workable position. If universities insist on
retaining the copyright to on-line courses, faculty members could potentially
face numerous problems.
The main focus of this paper will be on the issues surrounding copy-
right ownership in the academia context. Part II of this paper will explore
the history of copyright law, and specifically the work for hire doctrine.
Particular focus will be given to the rise of the work for hire doctrine in the
1909 Copyright Act and the changes that the doctrine has undergone since
then. Part III of this paper will look at the relevant case law that has dealt
with the work for hire doctrine in relation to academics. Part IV will focus
on the unique issues presented by on-line courses, and explain why copyright
ownership should vest with the creating professor. In the conclusion, I will
attempt to offer some comments explaining my position as to why courts
should continue to find a teacher exception to the work for hire doctrine.
II. A HISTORICAL EXAMINATION
Copyright law in the United States continues to be a constantly
changing doctrine. The law first appeared in America in the continental state
statutes. It then progressed to the national level in the Constitutional provi-
sion, and continued to be codified through the legislative acts passed by
Congress. The theories of American copyright law can be traced to theories
that existed in early English law. The influence of English law can easily be
seen in some of the continental state copyright statutes.6 When enacting the
first copyright laws, a few of the continental states mirrored their statutes
after the language used in the English Statute of Anne. Authors as well as
publishers were given rights under these statutes.7 The majority of the states
however, chose to vest copyright protection solely in the authors of the
works.8 This decision reflected the theory that the creator of the work should
bear the fruits of his labor. In addition to the natural rights theory prevalent
in these state statutes, the encouragement of learning also was considered
important. The statutes limited the author's rights to printing, publishing,
and selling thus leaving the public with various uses of the work as long as
the author's profits were secured.9 For a time, the state statutes served their
5. Id. at 5.
6. LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 183 (1968).
7. Id. at 188.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 190.
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purposes well, but as the national government formed many realized that
copyright law would need to be consistent across the states.
When the Constitutional Convention met, the following four copy-
right theories were popular: learning, protection of authors, monopoly con-
cerns, and statutory privilege."° The statutory privilege theory focused on
the idea that the right to copyright was an existing right that Congress could
ensure by granting it to authors through the passing of a statute. 1 The word
"securing" in the Constitution was interpreted to mean that the "statutory
copyright was to affirm and protect an existing right, not create one."' 2 The
founders managed to include all theories in the Constitutional provision.
The Legislature was given the power to pass laws giving authors protections
limited both in time and scope. Such protections were instituted to promote
learning. The primary focus on learning and protecting the rights of authors
is apparent in the following language of the Constitution, "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries.' 3 When Congress enacted the first copyright act in 1790, this fo-
cus quickly changed.
The Copyright Act of 1790 was similar to the Constitutional provi-
sion in the sense that the same four prevalent theories of copyright were rec-
ognized in the Act. Some have argued that instead of focusing on the ele-
ments of learning and author's rights, the Act emphasized the importance of
monopoly concerns and statutory provisions. 4 While it is true that the Act
put in provisions for these concerns, I disagree with the assertion that the
natural rights theory disappeared from the statute. The statute limited the
protection of privileges to the author or authors of maps, charts, and books,
for a term of fourteen years. Also required was a registration of title with
the clerk's office. Because the Act still afforded these protections to authors
who took the steps to protect their work, I believe that the Act continued to
protect the fruits of the author's labor.
For almost one hundred and twenty years, the first copyright act re-
mained virtually unchanged. As authors began expanding the types of works
created, Congress realized that more protections needed to be granted. 5 In
1909, Congress passed the second Copyright Act. Among the many changes
10. Id. at 193-94.
11. Id. at 194.
12. Id.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. PATTERSON, supra note 6, at 198.
15. Patricia L. Bellia, Class Notes, Copyright and the Constitution course (Notre Dame, IN., Spring 2002)
(copy on file with author).
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was the expansion of the scope of works that were given protection. Instead
of just protecting maps, charts, and books, all the writings of an author were
given protection. 6 Under the new act authors were also allowed to assign
their copyrights to others. 7 It was also under the 1909 Act that the work for
hire doctrine first appeared. Under § 26 of the Act, Congress stated that the
term "author" could apply to an employer if the works were made for hire. 1"
The work for hire doctrine has extensively been modified over the
years. The 1909 Act did not provide any definitions for the terms "em-
ployee" and "work for hire." Thus, the courts were left to provide meaning
to the statute. The courts concluded that work for hire status should apply to
works made by employees in the "regular course of their employment."' 9
Many courts required the parties to show who had supervision and control
over the work.20 This caused a presumption of ownership to lay with em-
ployers because of their general supervisory power.
The Copyright Act of 1976 filled in many of the gaps inherent in the
1909 Act. It took years and numerous negotiations and drafts to finally
come up with the exact provisions of the 1976 Act.2' Congress realized that
the 1909 Act needed to be revised as early as 1955. It was a slow process,
but by 1961 the Copyright Office issued a proposal to distinguish between
employee works and works made by independent contractors. 22 Once this
distinction was in place, the Copyright Office in 1963 issued a preliminary
bill to limit the work for hire doctrine to only those works prepared by em-
ployees while working within the scope of their employment. The Office
decided to not include special orders or commissioned works.23 Book pub-
lishers protested this limitation. In 1965, a compromise was reached and
embodied what ultimately became the "work for hire" definition in § 101 of
the 1976 Act.24 Congress allowed for the commissioned works category, but
limited it to four enumerated cases. Later, the House Committee on the Ju-
diciary expanded the enumerated cases, and today there are nine total.
16. See, Copyright Act, § 3, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed 1976).
17. Id. at § 28.
18. Id. at § 26.
19. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 744 (1989).
20. Patricia L. Bellia, Class Notes, Copyright and the Constitution course (Notre Dame, IN., Spring 2002)
(copy on file with author).
21. Reid, 490 U.S. at 743.
22. Id. at 744.
23. Id. at 745.
24. Id. at 746.
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Section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 defines a "work made for
hire" as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution
to a collective work [or for certain other purposes] . . .if the parties
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work
shall be considered a work made for hire.25
Out of the nine enumerated categories for commissioned works, the
category of "instructional texts" could be the most relevant to courts in the
context of on-line courses. Section 101 lists "instructional texts" as one of
the nine enumerated categories and defines it as "[a] literary, pictorial, or
graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in sys-
tematic instructional activities. 26
Section 26 of the 1909 Act referring to authors was retained in the
new act but expanded and became § 201(b) of the 1976 Act. Section 201(b)
states that, "in the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other per-
son for whom the work was prepared is considered the author... and, unless
the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright."27
It is important to detail the above history of copyright law for two
primary reasons. First, the history shows that a work could attain work for
hire status in two primary ways.28 It could be a work made by an employee
within the course of employment, or it could be a work made by an inde-
pendent contractor. In the case of an independent contractor, if the work fell
under one of the enumerated categories, and the parties expressly agreed in
writing, the work would be considered a work made for hire. Second, the
history demonstrates that because Congress and the House Committee on the
Judiciary enumerated express categories, statutory interpretation would war-
rant that only those categories be given work for hire status. 29 These conclu-
sions from legislative history have aided the courts in their determinations of
works made for hire.
The 1976 Act is the applicable statutory provision for copyright law
today. However, given the turbulent changes that copyright law has under-
gone, it is not surprising that courts continue to interpret the statute differ-
25. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
26. Id.
27. Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412,416 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)).
28. Reid, 490 U.S. at 747.
29. Id. at 748.
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ently. The Seventh Circuit has continued to find a teacher exception to the
work for hire doctrine, while others have argued that the 1976 Act abolished
any such exception.3" The Supreme Court has not decided the issue, and thus
it remains a hot topic.
For the more straightforward cases the Court has attempted to pro-
vide some guidelines for determining if works are made for hire. In the case
of Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid, the Court stated that it first
determines if an employee or an independent contractor prepares the work by
using common law agency principles.3 If the work falls under one of these
categories, the Court then applies the appropriate provision under § 101.
Although the scope of this paper prevents a more substantive analysis of
copyright history, the above summary hopefully sheds some light on where
copyright law and particularly the work for hire doctrine stand today.
III. CASE LAW
Two cases, both decided by the Seventh Circuit, have found a
teacher exception to the work for hire doctrine. The teacher exception basi-
cally holds that faculty members retain the copyright privileges to their
works produced while employed at an academic institution. The reasoning
behind allowing such an exception is varied. While some universities tend
to undervalue faculty publications because they do not produce large profits,
the faculty members themselves accord high value to their publications.
This value in large part stems from the concept of "publish or perish." Aca-
demic institutions require faculty members to publish works. Thus, faculty
members do not just value their works for the profit aspect, but also for the
security that they provide to their positions. The progress of technology
towards on-line courses has increased the competition among academic insti-
tutions.3" This has caused many institutions to closely reexamine their posi-
tions relating to copyright ownership.33
The Seventh Circuit first identified a teacher exception to the 1976
Act in the case of Weinstein v. University of Illinois.34 Weinstein was an
Assistant Professor at the University of Illinois. He created an internship
program for pharmacy students and the University funded the program.
When the program was first proposed to the school, Weinstein asked another
professor and the director of the pharmacy to help in the proposal.
30. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee And The Copyright Act Of 1976, 54 U.
CHi. L. REV. 590, 598-600 (1987).
31. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751.
32. Kwall, supra note 1, at 2.
33. Id.
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Weinstein maintained that he was responsible for the majority of the ideas,
but admitted that the writing of the results was a joint effort. Eventually a
paper was written about the program and Weinstein brought suit when his
name was not the first listed author. The district court dismissed
Weinstein's due process challenge and held that the University owned the
copyright to the article and could thus do whatever it wanted with it.3' The
district court reasoned that the University owned the article because it was a
"work for hire., 36
The University's policy allowed professors to retain copyright own-
ership to their works unless the work fell into one of the following three
categories: (1) the University had an agreement with an external party that
required them to hold or transfer copyright ownership; (2) works expressly
commissioned in writing by the University; or (3) works created out of a
requirement of employment or an assigned University duty.37 The Univer-
sity argued that Weinstein's article fell under the third category because he
was required to create internship programs as part of his position.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the University's argument.
Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook stated that the "demands of depart-
ments deciding whether to award tenure-will be" one of the primary factors
behind many academic works.38 He pointed to the fact that the University
had conceded that a professor who developed a mathematic theorem would
be able to retain copyright ownership to his article that published the theo-
rem.39 Referring to the source of Nimmer on Copyright,4 ° Judge Easterbrook
explained that from the beginning of copyright law, the longstanding tradi-
tion has been to allow professors to maintain copyright ownership in their
works." He concluded that Weinstein did have a property interest in the
article, and further held that the tradition applied to all scholarly articles and
"other intellectual property."42
Just one year later, the Seventh Circuit again discussed a teacher ex-
ception to the work for hire doctrine in the case of Hays v. Sony Corp. of
America.43 In Hays, two high school business teachers developed a manual
for using word processors. A few years later, the high school purchased new
34. Weinstein v. Univ. of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987).
35. Id. at 1093.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1094.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[B][l][b] (1978 ed.).
41. Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1094.
42. Id.
43. Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).
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word processors from Sony. The school provided Sony with the manual so
that they could revise it and make it applicable to the new machines. The
teachers who had created the original manual sued Sony for copyright in-
fringement. The district court held that the manual was a work for hire and
dismissed the case." In writing the opinion for the Seventh Circuit, Judge
Posner went into an in-depth discussion regarding the teacher exception to
the work for hire doctrine.45
Judge Posner began his discussion by referring to the text of the stat-
ute. Under § 101 of the 1976 Act, Judge Posner agreed that it might appear
that the manual was a work for hire.4 6 The teachers were employees of the
high school and had created the manual under the scope of their employ-
ment. There was also no signed contract that entitled the teachers to retain
the copyright to the work. Despite these facts, Judge Posner explained that
until the 1976 Act was enacted, works made for hire were left undefined.47
Some courts had found that academic writings did not fall under works for
hire, and thus created the teacher exception. Conceding that the authority
surrounding the teacher exception was scanty, Judge Posner claimed that the
basis was "not scanty because the merit of the exception was doubted, but
because, on the contrary, virtually no one questioned that the academic au-
thor was entitled to copyright his writings. 48 Judge Posner emphasized that
despite Congress's knowledge in 1976 of the court-created teacher exception
doctrine, there is no mention of it in either the legislative history or the 1976
Act itself.49 Judge Posner interprets this intentional omission of reference to
the teacher exception doctrine as Congress's intent to not abolish it.
Many good reasons exist today for allowing a teacher exception to
the work for hire rule even though many professors do academic writing as
part of their duties of employment.5 0 One of the reasons cited by Judge Pos-
ner in the Hays case was the lack of supervision exerted over professors by
the universities. 51 For the most part, professors are able to write their articles
on their own accord, free from university input and requirements. Aside
from the situation where a university directs a professor to create teaching
materials for use by other professors in the future, universities do not super-
vise faculty and do not exploit their works.52 Although universities provide
44. Id. at 413.
45. Id. at 416-18.
46. Id. at 416.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 416.






computers, library resources, and other facilities to professors, this does not
prove that the university is the "motivating force behind the work."53
In the Reid case, the district court held that Reid was an employee
under § 101(1) of the statute, because Community for Creative Non-
Violence was the motivating force behind the statue created by Reid.54 The
Supreme Court ultimately found Reid to be an independent contractor, but
one of the factors it used in determining if a person was an independent con-
tractor was the amount of control that the hiring partner exerted over the
manner and means of the work.55 It is possible that courts could view aca-
demic articles as specially created works done outside of the general scope
and control of the professor's regular employment.
Because the teacher exception was a judicially created protection
that arose from courts interpreting the work for hire provision of the 1909
Act, many scholars have argued that the exception was abolished by the en-
actment of the 1976 Act.56 It is a given that faculty members are employees
of universities. All that is left to decide is whether or not academic writings
fall within the scope of the faculty members' employment.57 Academic writ-
ings do have an impact on salary, teaching loads, tenure, and other employ-
ment related decisions.58 Thus, it is argued that the universities should own
the copyright to all academic works, according to a strict interpretation of
the 1976 Act.
This does not necessarily have to be the case. There is no indication
that when enacting the 1976 Act, Congress intended to abolish the excep-
tion.59 Congress knew that some courts were applying the exception and yet
they did not expressly forbid it in the statute. Another possible loophole for
the exception rests with the text of § 201(b). 60 This section not only requires
the work to be a work for hire, but also requires that the work be prepared
for the employer. It could be argued that academic writings are prepared for
the individual benefit of the author and for the promotion of the general pub-
lic's knowledge.
Some scholars have proposed the idea that if copyright to academic
writings vests automatically in the universities, then academics could chal-
53. Dreyfss, supra note 30, at 597.
54. Reid, 490 U.S. at 735.
55. Id. at 750.
56. Dreyfuss, supra note 30, at 598.
57. Id. at 599 (citing Todd F. Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They Works Made for Hire Under the 1976
Copyright Act?, 9 J.C. & U.L. 485 (1982-83); Leonard D. Duboff, An Academic's Copyright: Publish and
Perish, 32 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. 17 (1984)).
58. Id.
59. Hays, 847 F.2d at 416.
60. Id. at 417.
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lenge the constitutionality of the 1976 Act under both the First Amendment
and the Copyright Clause.61 Under the First Amendment, professors could
argue that if the Act vests the copyright with the university automatically,
then the university would own all of the writings of the professor for the
entire time the professor is employed. 62 This could cause a problem with the
distribution of the professor's ideas. The university could decide to not dis-
tribute the work because of a lack of economic benefit. Such "forced si-
lence, condoned by the federal act," could pose a First Amendment prob-
lem.63
This argument could carry weight with the courts. One of the pur-
poses behind the Copyright Clause is to promote learning and the expression
of ideas. If universities prevent this expression because of a lack of eco-
nomic incentive, then they are in effect suppressing speech. It should not
matter that the author may be able to contract around this obstacle. A consti-
tutional violation is a constitutional violation. Universities should not be
able to violate the Constitution and then claim that their conduct is protected
because of the contractual rights that authors possess. In her article, The
Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, Professor Dreyfuss ar-
gues that a First Amendment challenge will likely "be poorly received by the
courts., 64 She claims that such arguments do not succeed because courts
"defer" to Congress on the proper weight to be given to the flow of informa-
tion and the "need to promote investment in creativity."65 While I agree that
courts generally will defer to Congress on this matter, I believe that if it is
shown that universities are causing a widespread problem of "forced silence"
by not distributing works, courts will examine such conduct under the First
Amendment.
Another related reason for allowing a teacher exception to the rule,
relates to the protection that the statute gives against public access to the
copyrighted work. If courts allowed copyright ownership to always vest
with the university, professors would not be able to disseminate their re-
search across various college campuses. 66 Such limitations would only pro-
hibit the promotion of learning that copyright law is supposed to advance.
The Copyright Clause poses a different problem with the statute.
Professor Dreyfuss asserts that professors could argue that Congress ex-
ceeded its authority by allowing employers to retain copyright ownership in
61. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 30, at 600.
62. Id. at 601.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 600.
65. Id. at 601.
66. Dreyfuss, supra note 30, at 597.
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works, when the employers have not "fulfilled the constitutional purpose of
enlarging the pool of knowledge."67 Professor Dreyfuss analogizes this ar-
gument to one made by Judge Friendly in the case of Scherr v. Universal
Match Company.65 In Scherr, Judge Friendly dissented from the majority's
holding that a statue created by a serviceman at an army base was a work for
hire. The Copyright Clause only allows Congress the power to secure to
"authors" the rights to their works.69 Judge Friendly conceded that if the
employer exercises significant control over the production of the work, then
allowing the employer to be considered the author would be consistent with
the clause.70 However, if the "locus of the activity" remains within the ex-
clusive control of the author, Congress cannot grant the title of "author" to
the employer without exceeding its authority.7' Applying this reasoning to
academic context would mean that if a university does not exercise signifi-
cant control over the production of an article, then the copyright to the arti-
cle would remain with the faculty member.
As Professor Dreyfuss points out, Melville Nimmer has identified
some weaknesses inherent in this particular argument.7" One obvious weak-
ness is that the 1976 Act allows for employees to contract with universities
for copyright ownership. Therefore, Congress does not exceed its authority
when it assumes that the parties have negotiated ownership rights.73 Fur-
thermore, Nimmer explains that the transfer of ownership merely affects the
rules dealing with the length of the copyright and the "right to terminate the
grant."74 Nimmer concludes that Congress has the power to treat works for
hire differently because some of the benefits that the Act gives should be
"altered" if the work is created under an employment relationship.75
These weaknesses do not necessarily negate the Copyright Clause
argument. In contrast, Professor Dreyfuss argues that Nimmer only focuses
on financial considerations.7 6 The aims of the Copyright Clause go far be-
yond just the economic theory of copyright ownership. Nimmer ignores the
"concerns that flow from an intellectual commitment ' 77 to copyright. These
concerns should carry weight in a constitutional challenge to the 1976 Act.
67. Id. at 602.
68. Id. (citing Scherr v. Universal Match Co., 417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J., dissenting)).
69. Dreyfuss, supra note 30, at 602.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 603, (citing MELVILLE B. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.06 [cI] (1984)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 604.





IV. COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP ISSUES RELATING To ON-LINE COURSES
The cases discussed above recognized the custom of granting copy-
right ownership to professors for their academic writings. This is the best
rule from both an economic and intellectual theory of copyright. Granting
copyright ownership to professors not only prevents the suppression of
speech problem, but it also is the fairest policy because it allows professors
to reap the economic rewards for their hard work. Advocates of an eco-
nomic theory of copyright argue that authors should enjoy the profits that
result from their labor.7" Advocates of an intellectual theory argue that aca-
demic works stem from the sole creative intellectual expression of profes-
sors, and therefore professors should own the copyright to their creative ex-
pressions. As Judge Posner recognized, for the most part professors create
their writings completely on their own accord, without the supervision or
control of the university. In many work for hire cases, the courts look to the
amount of control exercised over the employee or independent contractor by
the employer.79 This exercise of control is absent in the context of most aca-
demic writings.
I realize that in some cases a university may request a professor to
create an internship program or course for use by other professors in the fu-
ture. However, if the university does not exercise any control beyond its
initial request, then copyright ownership in most cases should still vest with
the professor. This should be the rule because the final product is the crea-
tive work of the professor. I would concede that if the professor is paid
solely to create this program, and the work is solely done on university time,
then the professor's claim to copyright ownership likely would fail under the
work for hire doctrine. But, if the professor is not paid specifically to create
the program and devotes much of his own time to the creation of the pro-
gram, then the professor should keep the copyright to his work under the
teacher exception doctrine.
Today, with the creation of distance education, universities are real-
izing that the stakes involved with copyright ownership are higher than ever.
On-line courses create a "potential financial windfall"80 for the owner of the
copyright. They allow universities the ability to offer the same course re-
peatedly without having to pay a professor to teach the course. Once the
course is developed and fixed into a program, the need for a professor is sig-
nificantly reduced. Such programs pose unique copyright law issues.
78. See, Patterson, supra note 6, at 186.
79. See, e.g., Reid, 490 U.S. at 742.
80. Kwall, supra note 1, at 2.
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On-line courses are not all identical. The different variations in the
programs definitely affect the legal issues involved."' If a professor creates
an on-line course without any direction or order from the university, then the
professor should own the copyright to his work. This is fair both from an
economic and intellectual standpoint. The course comes from the fruit of the
professor's labor and is his sole intellectual creation. Vesting copyright in
the university would be analogous to allowing the university to force a pro-
fessor to stay and teach a specific course forever. When a professor leaves a
university, the class content and insights provided by that professor leave
too. The on-line course is replacing the class course ordinarily taught by the
professor. Copyright ownership to such a course should be vested with the
creator.
In contrast, if a professor is paid by the university for creating the
course, or is directed to create a course, the university could have some
strong copyright ownership arguments.8 2 If the university is paying the pro-
fessor and giving the professor a format for what should be offered, then the
university would have economic and intellectual interests in the work. If the
professor were receiving money specifically for creating the on-line course,
one possible position the courts could take would be to view the professor as
an independent contractor. If the work falls under § 101's enumerated cate-
gory of "instructional texts," and the professor did not contract with the uni-
versity to retain his copyright, then the court could arguably award owner-
ship to the university. As mentioned in Part I, courts could interpret the
enumerated category of "instructional texts" to include on-line courses. The
courses could be viewed as "graphic works." However, to get around the
statute, professors could argue that the works are not created for the "pur-
pose of use in systematic instructional activities." If courts are unwilling to
recognize a teacher exception to the work-for-hire doctrine, then Congress
should pass a statute imposing a default rule that vests copyright ownership
with professors unless they contract to assign ownership to the university. I
will more fully explain why this is the better result in the following pages.
Universities that currently use on-line courses have dealt with the
copyright ownership issue in different ways. The University of North Texas
allows royalties to be paid to the faculty members when their courses are
repeatedly offered, and the University allows the professors to keep some of
the tuition money that is gained from the on-line courses.83 Unfortunately,
this is not the common practice. Some institutions actually create corporate
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 4.
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entities that hire professors to create courses so that there will be no debate
that the work was produced within the scope of employment.8 4 Out of con-
cern for such practices, the American Association of University Professors
advocates that professors should own the "courseware" they develop. 5
Courts have yet to decide the issue of academic ownership in the
context of on-line courses. However, ownership claims to course materials
in other contexts have been argued. In the case of Williams v. Weisser, 6 a
California appeals court decided that a professor owned the copyright to his
lectures that were copied down by a student and subsequently sold in note
format by the defendant. The case was decided under the Copyright Act of
1909. Under the Act, unpublished works were protected by state common
law. 7 The defendant argued that the university owned the copyright to the
professor's lectures. The court rejected the defendant's argument and held
that the professor owned the copyright unless he had assigned it to the uni-
versity. Concerned with contrary opinions, the court went on to outline the
downsides that could result if copyright were awarded to the university.88
One of the cited downsides concerns the mobility of professors.89 If
copyright to professors' on-line courses or lectures vests in the university
then this inhibits professors from accepting positions at other institutions. If
a university owns the copyright to the on-line course created by a professor,
then it follows that the university would be able to prohibit professors from
using and teaching from their posted syllabus at any other institution. An-
other example of how this rule could apply is in the case of a law professor
who develops a series of slides to explain a complicated Supreme Court
case. If the university owns the copyright to the professor's works, it fol-
lows that the professor would not be able to use these slides for teaching at
another university. Such a rule not only could impact professors who per-
manently leave a university, but also professors who take visiting professor-
ships for limited terms.
Another problem the court points to relates to the difficulty a univer-
sity will have in determining how much of a professor's expression in teach-
ing, that is later fixed in a work, stems from knowledge a professor already
has gained before working for the university.90 If the professor has clerked
for the Supreme Court, and then comes to teach constitutional law at the uni-
84. Id.
85. Id. at 5.
86. 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969), cited in Kwall, supra note 1, at 11.
87. Kwall, supra note 1, at 11.





versity, the knowledge that the professor already has relating to the subject
he is hired to teach is substantial. If the professor already has developed a
syllabus conveying the content of the course before coming to the university,
then the university does not have any claim to ownership. This expression
of knowledge was not developed as a result of working for the university.
When applying the 1976 Act to the Williams case, I do not believe a
change in the result is required. As previously mentioned, the 1976 Act pro-
vided two categories for works to be deemed "for hire." First, an employee
can create the work within the scope of employment, or second, the work can
be specially ordered or commissioned for certain uses and the parties can
agree that the work will be one made for hire.9' As Professor Kwall points
out, one of the enumerated categories under the commissioned works cate-
gory includes "instructional texts., 92 Professor Kwall argues that this cate-
gory provides the possibility that on-line courses "in their entirety" could be
works for hire.93 I disagree. An on-line course varies significantly from a
textbook. Students do not just read what is posted on-line. They have to
submit assignments and in some cases can post questions and receive an-
swers. In addition, most on-line courses require textbooks. I think that a
strong argument exists that the value and knowledge conveyed in an on-line
course varies significantly from an instructional text.
Professors also can argue that they did not create the on-line course
for the "purpose of use in systematic instructional activities,"94 as required
under the "instructional texts" definition to § 101. If a professor creates an
on-line course and grades the work done by students who take the course, the
professor could persuasively argue that the course was created for a specific
semester, and like any other classroom course, changes from year to year.
Thus, the course lacks the "systematic use" purpose.
Courts should continue to recognize that academic works do not fit
neatly into the "works made for hire" category. Courts' previous recognition
of this problem resulted in the creation of the teacher exception doctrine.
The Seventh Circuit has continued to apply this exception consistently to
academic writings. With the rise of new issues like on-line courses, it re-
mains to be seen what courts will do with academic works. To prevent
courts from interpreting academic works as falling under "works made for
hire," Congress should either amend the statute, or pass a new statute insti-
tuting a default rule that vests copyright ownership in professors automati-
91. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
92. Kwall, supra note 1, at 13.
93. Id.
94. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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cally. This new statute would in essence codify the teacher exception doc-
trine in law.
V. CONCLUSION
When evaluating who should own the copyright to on-line courses,
both economic and intellectual theories of copyright favor awarding owner-
ship to the professor who creates the course. This result is also warranted by
the downfalls that would result from a contrary decision. Even though the
creation of on-line courses can vary in content and formation, copyright
ownership should default to professors. This would solve the debate about
which category professors should be put into under § 101 of the 1976 Act.
Clearly, professors are employees of universities, but when they create on-
line courses on their own accord, strong arguments can be made that they are
independent contractors. By creating a default rule that vests copyright
ownership in the professor, this distinction does not even need to be made.
The default rule would also provide consistency across the courts because it
in effect would codify the teacher exception doctrine that some courts al-
ready apply.
The default rule is fair even when professors receive money from the
university to create the course. The university is receiving a benefit from the
creation of the course. Before paying the professor, the university could
require that the professor to assign the copyright ownership to the university.
If the university makes the professor a good offer, it is likely that the profes-
sor will contract with the university for the ownership rights.
Allowing copyright ownership to vest with a university in the case of
on-line courses creates too many unfair restraints on professors. Universities
could not only prevent professors from teaching similar courses at other in-
stitutions, but they could also prohibit the professor from disseminating his
ideas and research. Such limitations run counter to what copyright law was
designed to protect. Furthermore, it is impossible for universities to deter-
mine how much knowledge the professor had before working at the institu-
tion. If the professor creates an on-line course based on his knowledge of
constitutional law derived from his experience as a judge or clerk, the uni-
versity cannot claim that such knowledge was gained while working at the
university. Professors should be able to reap the benefits of their labor and
knowledge. Allowing professors to retain ownership to their works will fur-
ther the promotion of learning. The teacher exception to copyright law
should be recognized, and a default rule should be installed to automatically
vest copyright ownership with professors for their academic works.
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